The Government is considering whether and how to introduce digital government identities. This is partly because the Tony Blair Institute has made the case (here) and also because – as the Institute correctly says – Britain is falling behind other countries in using technology to make Government services more efficient, effective and reliable.

This is a good idea, provided the scheme meets five conditions set out below. And to build widespread support, it should be rebranded: these are not ‘digital identity cards’ but joined up digital transformation of Government.

Older readers will remember that the Blair government tried and failed to introduce identity cards – an idea which failed because many British people do not like the idea of being required to carry ‘papers’ that prove who they are.

The ‘digital identity card’ version sounded just as dystopian or perhaps worse. It is not an enticing prospect to think that the Government could build a vast database that includes our images and biometrics, our health history, our career history, our phone records and internet use, our income, tax and benefits payments, any property or vehicles we might own, our driving licences, when and how we leave and enter the country, and our interactions with the criminal justice system.

As I wrote in 2006, when a digital register was being considered:

The proposed identity register has run into considerable opposition. There are four main concerns about it:

• the existence of unique identity numbers would make possible the creation of a massive virtual database including the national DNA Database, electronic surveillance data and phone and internet surfing records. Civil servants and secret services would be able to access and search through comprehensive files on every person resident in the UK, including current and previous jobs and addresses, tax and finances, family relationships, health, and religious or political affiliations.
• there is a danger that comprehensive personal information could fall into the hands of third parties if there is a breach in IT security;
• the database could be very expensive, especially given the history of government IT projects which overrun their budgets;
• the national identity register underpins of the proposed introduction of national identity cards, which many people oppose.

There is an additional twist this time, which is that the Tony Blair Institute is funded by Larry Ellison of Oracle, which taints the proposal in the eyes of people who are suspicious of the agenda of Big Tech.

These suspicions – which are understandable and contain more than a grain of truth – have made it impossible to introduce efficient, effective, joined up Government systems.

This is not a new, nor uniquely British problem, and (as so often) if used properly, technology can provide the answers to these concerns. The Tony Blair Institute has done a good job at pointing to how other countries have tackled these issues.

As the TBI correctly argues, digital identities could, in theory, protect privacy more than the analogue alternatives. When you have to send utility bills, bank statements and copies of your driving licence to a private service provider, you are having to share a lot of information they do not need. It would be far better if a Government service could confirm what the provider needs to know (e.g. your age or your address) without having to share so much else about you. I made the same point here the other day: if the Government provided a simple age verification service, people would not have to upload a photo of their face or scan of their passport to commercial age-verification platforms.

The problem with the current debate is that it is portrayed as a binary choice between a Big Brother State that knows everything about you all in one place, or the anarchic (and inefficient) freedom of citizens going about their business without a workable means of demonstrating who they are or being able to claim their rights and privileges. There is an efficient middle ground that protects our civil liberties and enables us to have more efficient, more effective, more secure, and more private, services. And it is a solution we have long known about, but which has somehow not been put front-and-centre as an option we could adopt.

I wrote about this in an essay with IBM back in 2007, drawing heavily on the world-leading Estonia example (which continues to thrive today). You can read that essay here. It does not require any technical knowledge and it explains how Government information systems can be joined up and made more effective without putting civil liberties or citizens’ privacy at risk. Other countries – such as Denmark – have also managed to introduce government verification systems without jeopardising their civil liberties.

In 2006, I had set out the five principles that I argued should govern Government Digital Identities to make them both safe and effective.

I wrote then:

A national identity register done right

The following five principles should govern a joined up network of decentralized government databases integrated using a single personal identity registration number:

• government systems should communicate over a common secure messaging layer by means of encrypted messages which limit and log the transfer of information between systems; in general requests made by client systems should be structured so that the request does not reveal additional information to the server systems;
• citizens should be able to access all information held about them by government databases through a single web portal, to enable citizens to check that government-held information is accurate and to get it changed if necessary;
• each database should log every time personal information is accessed by any government official or system; citizens should be able to see which information has been accessed, by whom and for what purpose;  an explicit court order would be needed in advance for a government agency to access personal information covertly (as it is now for telephone taps).
• an information security auditor should be appointed as a public ombudsman to check that these principles are being implemented by all government systems.
• the introduction of an identity register should be considered separately from the issue of national identity cards and the collection of biometric data.  In particular, the benefits of a national identity register, which may be considerable, should not be used to advocate the introduction of identity cards or the collection and storage of biometric data.

This was not rocket science then, and it is not rocket science now. It is a shame we have wasted so much time without making progress towards more efficient Government systems, which we could have done if the Government had put safeguards like this in place from the outset.

All these principles could all be met without jeopardizing the efficient implementation of government systems, and they would alleviate all the concerns (civil liberties, security and cost) that people have about an identity register. Because the Government lacked the political vision and technological understanding to put safeguards in place, we have been left with nothing.

The only thing I would add today – nearly twenty years later – is that we should not market this ideas as ‘digital identities’, an ‘identity register’ or (even worse) ‘digital identity cards’. Without wanting to sound Orwellian, I think we should focus on the positive aspects of a scheme that enable citizens to get better, more efficient services, protect their privacy, and hold Government to account. I don’t have a great alternative name in mind, but I think people would like a “Government Portal” more than a “National Identity Card”. (Until it was abolished in 2019, the ‘Government Gateway’ had the right vibe.)

This is an example where the ideological extremes – for and against digital identity cards – are wrong. As usual, there is an option of a middle ground which is technologically feasible, cost effective, proven in practice, and better than either extreme.